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ABSTRACT 
Successful adoption of natural resource management technologies requires that 
important fundamentals of property rights be established.  Because disputes over property 
rights occur universally, the ability to successfully defend one’s rights to property exercises a 
central influence on the tenure security necessary for technology adoption.  However, 
defending rights to property rests upon the possession of evidence that is readily available and 
widely regarded as legitimate.  This paper presents work carried out in postwar Mozambique 
on the availability and legitimacy of evidence pertaining to land tenure dispute resolution. 
What is unusual about the Mozambique case is that the physical presence of a natural resource 
management technology—agroforestry trees in this case—also serves as one of the most 
widely available and legitimate forms of evidence in the postwar period.  Such an arrangement 
reveals important aspects about the reverse relationship between property rights and 
technology adoption. While such an evidence role for a technology may at first appear to 
encourage further adoption of agroforestry, important influences on property rights in the 
postwar setting serve to discourage full adoption and jeopardize the long-term presence of 
existing agroforestry trees.  It remains to be seen if recent legislative changes regarding 
property rights will successfully engage customary forms of evidence and encourage full 
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LAND DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN MOZAMBIQUE:  
 INSTITUTIONS AND EVIDENCE  






1.  INTRODUCTION 
Nonadoption of natural resource management (NRM) technologies frequently 
occurs in an environment lacking in functioning land tenure dispute resolution institutions 
viewed as legitimate and workable by the parties concerned. The frequency, severity, and 
perception of land conflict and the character of land dispute resolution institutions have a 
fundamental influence on the resource access arrangements and tenure security necessary 
for technology adoption.  Because all societies experience land disputes, the formation or 
evolution of customs or rules pertaining to legitimate evidence of rights to property is 
important to tenure security and resource access.  Such evidence is a fundamental part of 
institutions regarding property rights, with repercussions on disputes and their resolution.  
If forces serve to alter the availability and legitimacy of evidence, then the associated 
institutions will also be altered, with implications for constraints and opportunities 
regarding technology adoption.  This can be the case especially when an aspect of NRM 
technology is also regarded as evidence.  This paper considers postwar Mozambique as a 




of evidence regarding claims to property, and the relationship of this evidence to cashew 
agroforestry as an NRM technology (including adoption and maintenance).   
The first influence considered stems from the disparate approaches to land tenure 
taken by customary versus formal tenure systems, whereby different groups attempting to 
access the same land may view and/or practice relationships to land very differently. This 
can result in evidence for a claim to land being regarded as legitimate within a tenure 
system but not legitimate between systems. Complicating this is Mozambique’s recent 
history of armed conflict, which significantly altered the availability of evidence.  One of 
the more important outcomes of these two forces acting in tandem is a comparative shift 
in the importance of certain forms of evidence that are both available after the war, and 
legitimate within and between tenure systems, including intact systems (still in place to 
varying degrees after the war) and disrupted systems (areas and populations constituting 
significant percentages of migrants).  Such a shift can be especially pronounced for less 
powerful groups.  The heightened or reduced value or utility of certain forms of evidence 
(and attendant institutions) has significant effect on both property rights and NRM 
technology adoption. The nature of such effects depends on the nature of the evidence, 
and its relationship to the technology in question.  
With empirical research carried out in Mozambique, this analysis considers land 
tenure conflict resolution as a “legitimate evidence” and “available evidence” problem in 
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its relationship to cashew agroforestry, where cashew trees have become highly valued 
forms of evidence.  Important in this regard is how customary, migrant, and formal 
approaches to land tenure, together with the recent war, have shaped the relative 
legitimacy and availability of forms of evidence, and the resulting impacts on dispute 
resolution institutions and technology adoption. 
2.  BACKGROUND ON MOZAMBIQUE 
THE WAR, RURAL RE-INTEGRATION, AND LAND TENURE 
The recent 16-year civil war in Mozambique dislocated approximately six million 
people (primarily small-scale agriculturalists) from land resources to which they are now 
returning and reclaiming.  This comprises the largest reintegration of refugees and 
displaced persons in the history of Africa (USCR 1993).  Although the war officially 
ended in 1992, the lack of confidence of the general population about the actual end to the 
conflict delayed moves back into agriculture (USCR 1993).  As a result, the UN expected 
to continue its resettlement activities in Mozambique until the year 2000 (Lauriciano 
1995).   
Resource tenure issues are increasingly coming to the fore as populations respond 
to what they perceive to be lasting peace, and make decisions about returning to areas of 
origin or migrating elsewhere and re-engaging in agriculture.  Many demobilized and 
                                                                                                                                                 




dislocated smallholders have returned to find their lands occupied by others, resulting in 
significant numbers of land disputes (Willett 1995; Galli 1992). At the same time, rural 
households are expanding areas under cultivation with each successive season as farmers 
bring areas long under fallow due to the war back into cultivation (USAID 1996).  Further 
complicating access to land are large-scale recovery efforts to rehabilitate whole 
agricultural sectors, such as cashew and livestock production.  These efforts involve free 
or greatly subsidized saplings and animals (connected to the landscape in some fashion), 
which are frequently used to claim land.   
All land belongs to the state in Mozambique, but with limited capacity to exercise 
authority over land, there is considerable ambiguity over exactly what rights individuals, 
communities, and the state have.  Even if the national land tenure framework operated 
perfectly and the necessary enforcement capacity existed, this would not resolve the 
complicated land conflicts emerging in postwar Mozambique.  The central issue is less 
the lack of a surveying service and an official agency of coordination and arbitration, than 
the legitimacy of existing services with the competence and accountability to solve land 
conflicts for different groups (Tanner and Monnerat 1995).  While recent political change 
increasingly recognizes the legitimacy of local, customary authority structures, the land 
law in place at the end of the war did not recognize customary tenure systems and 
therefore denied community access rights to land not currently under cultivation.  The 
Land Law also did not recognize customary decisions that resolve conflicts between 




land tenure system.  Thus lands incorporated in fallow systems, forest extraction, grazing, 
and land otherwise held by communities are recognized as vacant, and are vulnerable to 
occupation by commercial land interests able to obtain title, resulting in widespread land 
disputes (Tanner and Monnerat 1995). 
One of the features of postwar land tenure in Mozambique is that agricultural 
reintegration for many small-scale producers has begun with an initial dependence on 
locations where the most fertile land, perennial water supplies, infrastructure, markets, 
relief services, and physical security are present together.  Migration to such areas 
occurred throughout and after the war, with food-insecure migrants coming into conflict 
with long-term customary residents.  However, large land interests are also most 
interested in property acquisition in these agronomically endowed, or “critical resource” 
areas.  At least nine million hectares of land have been awarded through the formal land 
tenure system to concessions for farming, hunting, tourism, and mining activities.  
Practically all these concessions overlap with settlements of smallholders, who were not 
part of formal land allocation decisions (Moll 1996).  These nine million hectares occupy 
the highest quality land of the 35 million hectares of arable land, including all the major 
river basins and land near infrastructure and towns (Moll 1996).  This has generated 
further conflict between migrants, in-place communities, and concession holders, in an 
environment where property rights (including dispute resolution) institutions between 




BACKGROUND ON CASHEW AGROFORESTRY IN MOZAMBIQUE 
Since the introduction of cashew trees to Mozambique by the Portuguese during 
the colonial era, trees have been established along the entire length of Mozambique’s 
coastline and for a distance of up to 200 km inland, covering approximately one-third of 
the surface area of the country (CCL 1994).  In the early 1970s Mozambique was the 
world’s largest producer of cashew nuts in shell, and cashew was the primary export 
commodity (CCL 1994).  Cashew trees exist largely on smallholder land in Mozambique, 
in groves and intermixed in cropping patterns with cassava, cowpea, maize, and 
groundnuts (CCL 1994).  Planting and maintaining new trees is a fundamental aspect of 
cashew agroforestry, as is removing older nonproducing trees to create space in closed 
canopy groves and tree/crop associations.  The very large decline in cashew production is 
to a large extent due to tree senility resulting in low yields or the end of production in old 
age trees, with very little tree replacement (CCL 1994).   
The war and the associated collapse of the rural economy have impacted cashew 
agroforestry significantly.  Older trees were not removed, existing producing trees were 
not maintained (pruned, brush cut away from beneath trees and so on) and perhaps most 
importantly, new trees were not planted over large areas of the country as populations 
were dislocated, and transport, marketing, and processing of cashew were disrupted 
(Finnegan 1992; CCL 1994).  
A recent national cashew tree population survey found very low numbers of trees 




population are in younger age classes  (0–5, 6–10 years), with 20–30 percent between 16 
and 25 years old, and 60–70 percent over 25 years of age (CCL 1994).  A significant 
percentage of the younger trees that do exist appear to be self-seeded from the large stock 
of neglected adult trees (CCL 1994), meaning that their spatial placement either within an 
annual crop association or in a cashew grove is not optimized for an agroforestry system.  
While some studies note that production begins to decline after age 20 (FAO 1987; 
MOS/SST 1989) there is some disagreement as to the actual range in cashew tree 
productivity (CCL 1994).  Throughout the cashew zone in Mozambique, very few trees 
are completely removed, in contrast to Tanzania and Kenya where farmers actively 
remove unproductive trees for use as firewood (CCL 1994).  Thus a primary problem in 
Mozambique is the adoption (or postwar re-adoption) of tree replacement strategies and 
techniques, and hence a renewed role of agroforestry in natural resource management.   
3.  METHODOLOGY 
In order to consider land conflict and how evidence operates for, and between 
smallholders, largeholders, and migrants, in 1996 social surveys were carried out (Unruh 
1997) in two critical resource areas, and a control area in the northern part of the country.  
The idea was to compare the role of different forms of evidence (and customs and norms 
regarding evidence) in land dispute resolution.  
The data for the study were gathered in the provinces of Nampula and Cabo 




households in 21 villages, with villages distributed in three sets of seven villages each. 
Two of these sets were situated in agronomically endowed, or “critical resource” 
locations where fertile soils, perennial water, markets, infrastructure, and transport are 
fairly close together and thus are also locations most favored by large landholder 
interests.  The third set of seven villages was dispersed within Nampula province in areas 
much less agronomically endowed, and not in critical resource areas. This third set acts as 

















Villages for the control set were selected based on their location in less 
agronomically favored areas in Nampula province.  Households within villages were 
selected according to a stratified random sampling, whereby all households of each 
village were divided according to their relationship with a large landholder interest 
(cotton producers in this area) and then randomly selected.  Smallholder proximity to 
cotton production is the largest source of smallholder versus largeholder land conflict in 
Nampula and Cabo Delgado (Tanner 1996).  For control villages, households were 
stratified according to their participation and nonparticipation in a CARE oil seeds 
project, and randomly selected.  The decision to participate in the oil seeds project in a 
village was left to the household.
1  Although this choice, and the subsequent stratification, 
are not directly relevant to the present land tenure study, this subsample adequately 
represents households in noncritical resource areas.  
4.  CRITICAL RESOURCE AREAS AND THE CONTROL SET 
Tables 1, 2, and 3 provide a look at some of the more relevant differences among 
the three sets of villages. Generally, those occupying the critical resource areas (especially 
Montepuez) are in a more constrained and difficult situation regarding land tenure. 
Migrants numbers are higher, land conflicts and loss due to conflicts are more 
                                                 
1  This was part of a larger study dealing with land tenure and food security, as 




problematic, agricultural investments (such as field bunding, fertilizer, and fences) are 




the number of years of education, surprisingly, is higher (Table 1).   In general high 
values for tenure security are more frequent in the control set, while the critical resource 
sites have fewer respondents who are tenure secure (Table 2).  Conflict resolution 
between smallholders using the customary tenure regime is regarded as more “unjust” in 
critical resource areas, as is land conflict resolution between smallholders and 
largeholders using the formal system (Table 3).  
Table 1—Summary of selected variables for the control set and critical resource 
areas 
 Village  sets
1 
Variables Control  set  Monapo  Montepuez 
  (percentage) 
Share of migrants  10  23  73 
Reports that smallholders lose land in the area  23  34  88 
Perception that land conflicts are a problem  64  91  92 
Perception that arrival of outsiders to obtain land is 







  (summed years for household) 
Education   1.4  6.5 7.4 
      
Average number of        
Land conflicts  0.21  0.53  0.49 
Farm investments  5.5  5.2  2.4 
Source: Unruh (1997). 
1.  Significant differences exist between village sets at the 0.05 level, with the exception of Monapo and 
Montepuez for “Perception of land conflicts as a problem”; and the control set and Montepuez for 




Table 2—Tenure security for the three village sets 
Tenure Security index  Control set  Monapo set  Montepuez set 
Low:  8–15  10 27 50 
Medium:  16–21  34 45 43 
High: 22–30  56  28  7 
Source: Unruh (1997). 
a.  Data is presented as the percentage of respondents within each set that fall within low, medium, and 
high measures for the tenure security index. 
b.  For land tenure security, an index was derived using 21 variables from the survey, including the general 
perception of land conflict (four variables); land loss and possibilities for losing land, including the role 
of title in land loss (eight variables); land lending (three variables); and investment in land (six 
variables).  These variables were scaled, so that greater values indicate less presence and severity of 
land conflict, less land loss and preoccupation over land loss, more lending, and more investment.  The 
values for the variables were added to give a scaled index for overall tenure security for each 
household.  The index ranges from 8 to 30 with higher values indicating greater tenure security.  Higher 
values are more frequent in the control, while the critical resource sites have fewer respondents that are 
tenure secure.  Means for the tenure security index for the Montepuez (15.8) and Monapo (18.2) 
critical resource areas are significantly different from the control set (21.4) (and from each other) at the 
0.05 level. 
 
Table 3—Legitimacy of land dispute resolution for smallholders 
Village set  Very just  Just  Unjust 
Resolution between smallholders, using the customary system
1 
Control 85  12  3 
Monapo 59  38  3 
Montepuez  29 53 17 
Resolution between smallholders, using the statutory legal tenure system 
Control 52  43  4 
Monapo 50  46  4 
Montepuez 47  47  7 
Resolution between smallholders and largeholders, using the statutory legal tenure system
1 
Control  24 44 33 
Monapo  14 31 55 
Montepuez  13 17 71 
Source:  Unruh 1997. 
Note:   Data is expressed as a percentage of each village set’s sample. 




CASHEW AGROFORESTRY TREES AS EVIDENCE 
Trees and Land Tenure  
In the developing world, economically valuable trees are among the most common 
and valuable forms of customary evidence for claiming “ownership” of land (Raintree 
1987; Fortmann and Riddell 1985 and the references cited in these works for Africa, 
Asia, and Latin America).  Numerous studies have looked at the role of economic or 
otherwise valuable trees in land tenure (Fortmann and Bruce 1988; Raintree 1987; Cohen 
1993; Fortmann and Ridell 1985 and the references cited therein).  Tree planting’s role as 
powerful evidence for land claims is underscored by the restriction on tree planting by 
certain groups (such as women, tenants, and migrants) and the failure of agroforestry 
programs that do not take into account this important custom regarding valuable trees.  Trees, 
by their enduring nature, can be evidence that lands in fallow are still “owned.”  This is 
important because land laws, including Mozambique’s, can stipulate that land is declared 
“abandoned” if uncultivated for more than a certain number of years, which is frequently 
much shorter than an adequate fallow period. 
In Mozambique, cashew tree tenure plays a large role in property rights 
institutions for smallholders, including land conflict resolution.  Forces associated with 
the war and the “disconnect” between customary, migrant, and formal tenure have acted 
to put even greater weight on older cashew trees compared to other forms of evidence. 




and maintenance of cashew agroforestry.  The remainder of this section examines the 
relative importance of cashew trees as evidence; the subsequent two sections consider the 
two primary forces that shape the availability and legitimacy of cashew and other forms of 
evidence; and the final three sections look at cashew agroforestry’s effect on property rights, 
factors important to the evolution of nonagroforestry evidence and institutions, and recent 
changes in the formal law to acknowledge forms of customary evidence. 
Cashew Evidence in the Three Village Sets  
For the three village sets in the study, the presence of cashew and other valuable 
trees is the single most important piece of evidence for defending or asserting rights to 
land, regardless of the average number of trees per smallholder.  For the control, Monapo, 
and Montepuez samples, 86, 93, and 90 percent, respectively, indicated cashew trees as 
important evidence with respect to the occupation and “ownership” of land.  These were the 
greatest percentages for any form of evidence (total of 30 forms) (Table 4).  When asked 
whether having trees provided a “guarantee” against loss of land, the percentages were also 
quite high: 99, 99, and 94 percent for the control, Monapo, and Montepuez, respectively 
(Table 5).  However the number of smallholders actually owning trees was much lower: 59, 
69, and 16 percent of the control, Monapo, and Montepuez samples; and the average number 
of trees owned in the three samples was also low: 25, 39, and 3 for the control, Monapo, and 
Montepuez (Table 5).  Thus while nearly all households consider trees as quite valuable 
evidence, many did not actually possess the evidence, and in Montepuez very few posses 




which customs and norms that respect cashew trees as evidence are in place after the war, 
compared to other forms of evidence.  The Montepuez village set is particularly noteworthy.  
While having the lowest percentage possessing trees and the lowest average number of trees 
per household, the percentage indicating this as important evidence is still quite high.  Thus 
the Montepuez set illustrates that even in situations where institutions regarding property 
rights are most disrupted (Tables 1–3), the norms regarding agroforestry trees as 
legitimate evidence are nonetheless operative.  
Thus, cashew agroforestry trees appear to provide strong evidence of claims to 
property, and legitimate evidence in dispute resolution.  With property rights and tenure 
security strengthened by this evidence role of agroforestry trees, theoretically this would 
provide incentives to further invest in cashew agroforestry (adoption).  However, as the 
following sections illustrate, several factors serve to complicate this investment 




Table 4—Percentage of respondents mentioning social, cultural-ecological, and 
physical evidence, by village set 
 
Evidence List  Control  Monapo  Montepuez 
Social evidence 
Village elders  13  10  0 
Local Leaders  25  10  0 
Local organization   3   0   
Testimony of family  16  11  0 
History of occupation   7   2  0 
Knowledge of community area   3   0  0 
Testimony of neighbors  36  45  3 
History of economic trees   1   2  1 
Cultural–Ecological Evidence 
Trails   4   3   1 
Cemeteries   3   7   1 
Location roads   4   0   0 
Sacred areas   1   3   0 
Ruins, old village   3   0   0 
Economic trees  86  93  90 
Tombs  15   7   0 
Field boundaries   3   2  15 
Location of old crops   0   0   1 
Physical Evidence 
Local terrain differences   5   5   4 
Very large trees  11   5  48 
Location of mountains   4   6   5 
Termite hills   5   5  28 
Rivers   8  11  28 
Soil type  31  26  61 
Near cotton land   0   3   0 
Boulders   1   5   1 
Location of hills   0   1   8 




Table 5—Summary of variables regarding agroforestry trees as evidence 
Village sets 
Variables  Control set  Monapo  Montepuez 
Average number of trees per household  25  39  3 
  (percentage) 
Agroforestry trees as important evidence   86  93  90 
Plan to plant trees  32  25  10 
Possess  trees  59 69 16 
Trees provide a “guarantee” of not losing land   99  99  94 
Source: Unruh  (1997). 
Note:  Average values for villages are significantly different at the 0.05 level for all three village sets in 
the category “Average number of trees per household,” for the control set and Monapo in the 
category “Agroforestry trees as important evidence,” and for Montepuez and the other two sites for 
the categories “Planning to plant trees” and “Possess trees.” 
 
5.  THE WAR: DISLOCATION AND AGRICULTURAL DISRUPTION 
The dislocations and disruptions attending the war have had significant impacts 
on the land tenure evidence “landscape” in two ways: 1) creating and maintaining an age-
gap in agroforestry trees, and 2) making other forms of evidence less available and 
legitimate.   
THE TREE AGE-GAP 
Several interrelated forces connected to the war have operated, often in a mutually 
reinforcing way, to create and maintain a significant age-gap in cashew agroforestry trees.  
Perhaps most important was the direct effect of the dislocation of six million people on 




residing on others’ land were prevented from planting by their hosts because it would be 
seen as a land claim.  Likewise, removing trees from such land would be seen as 
challenging the owner’s claims.  For dislocatees cultivating land of no clear ownership, 
the temporary nature of their residence deterred tree planting. For communities not 
dislocated, the war and resulting food security problems meant that the agricultural time 
horizons of many small scale producers were reduced considerably, effectively precluding 
tree planting with its expectation of production only after several years on land needed for 
much quicker producing annual crops.  At the same time older trees near the end of 
production were not removed, as they frequently still provided small amounts of cashew 
for food insecure agriculturalists.   
The village set with the greatest percentage planning to plant cashew trees in the 
coming year was the control, the sample with the lowest number of migrants from 
elsewhere and the greatest tenure security (Tables 4,1,2).  The other two village sets fit 
this pattern, that is, as the percentage of migrants increases, the percentage of those 
intending to plant cashew trees decreases, as does tenure security (Tables 1, 2, and 4).  
With migration higher in Montepuez and cashew trees fewest, this may suggest why 
tenure security is lowest and perception of unjust dispute resolution is highest. 
The frequency and severity of land conflict also influences the cashew age-gap.  
Key informant interviews in the three village sets revealed that smallholders in areas 
where conflicts are a large problem (Monapo and Montepuez, Table 1) are especially 




term occupation) over seedlings and saplings, which can be easily pulled up.  An 
additional constraint to new tree planting is that as more smallholders lose land in the 
course of disputes (different from dislocation due to the war) they must then rent out or 
borrow land from other smallholders, again discouraging planting.  In the overall context 
of cashew trees as evidence then, the tree age-gap has acted to shift emphasis (value) to 
older trees, primarily because this is what is most prevalent, and most meaningful as tree 
evidence.  Migrants are most likely discouraged from removing trees as evidence, 
because the areas they occupy are relatively crowded, and include local community 
members.  Thus, it would likely be known by whom the trees were cut, while the tree 
stump would attest to the fact that a tree once stood and had been cut. It would thus seem 
wiser for migrants to attempt borrowing or renting arrangements with local inhabitants, 
rather than attempt to overtly undermine their claims. 
Availability of Nontree Evidence 
The nature of dislocation during the war has meant that many agricultural areas 
were repeatedly occupied and abandoned at different times and by different groups. This 
has served to obscure, confuse and make less accessible or inaccessible many forms of 
evidence related to human occupation of the landscape.  It also lessens social interaction 
regarding prewar arrangements of land ownership, loaning, renting, purchase, and so on. This 
is perhaps most notably the case where migrants currently comprise a significant proportion of 
the local population. The problematic postwar existence or availability of such forms of 




importance and legitimacy of other forms of evidence (agroforestry) that remain in place, 
and so it provides a much clearer indication of the history of occupation.  
In order to ascertain differences in evidence availability among the three village 
sets, forms of evidence were first categorized as social, cultural-ecological, or physical.  
Social evidence is oral or testimonial evidence provided or confirmed by others in the 
community. It demonstrates occupation, and serves to tie individuals and households to 
local communities.  Social evidence also corroborates other social, as well as physical and 
cultural-ecological, evidence. Cultural-ecological evidence is defined as the physical 
pieces of evidence that exist due to human activity on the landscape, such as agroforestry 
trees, current and old field boundaries, cemeteries, and so on.  This evidence demonstrates 
occupation and corroborates social evidence and some other forms of cultural-ecological 
evidence.  Physical evidence is defined as naturally occurring terrain features that are easily 
observed by anyone, and demonstrates familiarity with an area, but corroborates no other 
category of evidence. 
These three categories of evidence vary considerably in their utility.  In other 
words the interplay of social and cultural-ecological evidence will be much more 
meaningful than simply an individual’s knowledge of where pieces of physical evidence 
(rivers, fallen trees, depressions, termite hills, and so on.) are located.  Because 
knowledge of the location of naturally occurring terrain features is readily observed by 
anyone, it does not have the value of other evidence that lends itself to corroboration, and 




cultural-ecological evidence that is most valuable in constructing an argument for a claim 
to land in a dispute.  This is because social evidence ties individuals to communities, and 
cultural-ecological evidence corroborated by social evidence constitutes the connection 
between the physical signs of land occupation due to human presence, and the social 
aspects, which are bound up in cultural-ecological evidence (inheritance of land, 
networks of lending land, land transaction, and so on.).  Such social evidence is at the 
heart of the definition of land tenure, which Middleton (1988) describes as “a system of 
relations between people and groups expressed in terms of their mutual rights and 
obligations with regard to land.” 
Table 4 compares the percentage of the village set samples favoring different 
forms of evidence within these three categories.  What is most striking are the differences 
in social and physical evidence for the three village sets, but especially between the 
control set and Montepuez.  Social evidence is largely lacking in the Montepuez set in 
favor of naturally occurring physical evidence, compared with the other two sets.  This 
indicates the high preference for evidence that is available, even though such evidence is 
of reduced utility compared with other forms.  Cultural-ecological evidence is essentially 
the same for the three sets, due to the large emphasis all sets place on agroforestry trees.  
However, there is a division within this evidence with regard to that evidence that ties 
individuals to community and land over the long-term (knowledge of and social 
attachment to tombs, cemeteries, sacred areas, village ruins, and so on) as opposed to 




so on).  Subtracting agroforestry trees from the list of cultural-ecological evidence, 
respondents in Montepuez were more likely than those in other sites to cite evidence that 
demonstrates shorter-term occupation of an area (Table 4).  If the control villages are the most 
“intact” communities, then it makes sense that social evidence and long-term cultural-
ecological evidence are most prevalent there. 
Overall, the ability of smallholders in Montepuez to build a good argument as to a 
land claim is compromised due to the lack of social evidence that can corroborate the 
existence of other social or cultural-ecological evidence.  This is most likely because the 
majority in the Montepuez sample are recent migrants (Table 1), and thus do not have the 
same community/land connection or community cohesion as households within the 
control or the Monapo village sets.  Of the migrants in the Montepuez set, only three (out 
of 94) households indicated some form of social evidence.  Thus reductions in the 
availability of social evidence for populations with significant numbers of migrants 
appear to result in a shift favoring forms of evidence that are available—physical 
evidence and some cultural-ecological evidence—with the relative permanence of older 
agroforestry trees emerging as one of the most important and durable pieces of evidence 
available. 
6.  DIFFERENT APPROACHES TO LAND TENURE 
The interaction of disparate approaches to land tenure in Mozambique influences 




looked at the influence of availability of evidence on shaping preferences for specific 
forms of evidence, the present section considers the influence of legitimacy of evidence 
on shaping evidence preferences across groups.  In postwar Mozambique there are three 
different general approaches to land tenure: 1) customary, 2) statutory legal, and 3) 
migrant or “disrupted.”  The latter approach is characterized by a comparative lack of 
social connections to community regarding land, and a higher value placed on naturally 
occurring physical forms of evidence in claims to land.  Land disputes involving parties 
from the different tenure approaches can involve attempts to bring to bear forms of evidence 
that are regarded as legitimate and therefore respected (institutions) within a certain approach.  
But, if not respected by the opposing party (through enforcement or custom), then such forms of 
evidence are relatively unworkable.  Violence aside, such a situation can then force the 
different parties, particularly the less powerful, to place increased value on evidence that 
is mutually legitimate.  
For the customary (control) and largely migrant (Montepuez) groups in the study, 
there are only two forms of evidence for which both groups express a relatively high 
preference: soil type and agroforestry trees (Table 4), with soil type much less important 
for both communities compared with agroforestry trees.  While similar data do not exist 
for largeholders (operating from the formal system), the land law in place at the end of 
the war acknowledged forms of smallholder evidence that demonstrates “occupation” 
(soil type does not), and explicitly disallowed social evidence.  While crops and field 




the war so as to be problematic for smallholders to connect with for purposes of evidence 
in a dispute, and these are less preferred (Table 4).  Agroforestry trees, on the other hand, 
especially the older trees (indicating long-term or previous occupation) are evidence of 
occupation in the formal land tenure system and can signify a more direct and permanent 
connection to land for smallholders.  Thus, agroforestry trees are the only remaining 
evidence for which there exist customs and rules (formal and informal) that pertain to them 
as evidence, not only within, but also between groups operating from the three different tenure 
approaches.  As disputes between these three groups become common in certain areas, 
agroforestry trees, as mutually acceptable and respected evidence for defending rights to land, 
will shape dispute resolution to put much greater weight on this evidence.  
All else being equal then, the actual presence of such evidence should influence 
the outcomes of disputes (land lost or not).  While not comparable in every way, Monapo 
and Montepuez seem to support this. Relatively, both sets experience the same measures 
for value of trees as evidence, conflict number, and perception of land conflict as a 
problem (Tables 1 and 5).  However the Monapo set, with many more cashew trees, 
indicates a much lower percentage believing smallholders lose land (Table 1), and higher 
percentages believing conflict resolution between smallholders and largeholders is less of 
a problem than conflicts between smallholders (Table 3). That the Monapo sample 
expresses greater tenure security (Table 2) also makes sense.  One might speculate that 




greater presence of social evidence (not allowed in the Land Law, but in many cases 
connectable to trees) perhaps plays a substantial role in outcomes of land conflict. 
Even in the presence of good evidence, conflicts are instigated for a variety of 
reasons, many stemming from poverty and instability in Mozambique, with migrants and 
largeholders alike seeking access to land in better areas with the hope of at least getting a 
crop from a piece of land before their claim is contested.  While the incidence of conflict 
is perhaps not overly affected by the presence of cashew trees (Monapo has more cashew 
trees than Montepuez and less migrants, but also more conflicts), outcomes of disputes 
perhaps are resulting in greater tenure security.  Comparisons between Monapo and 
Montepuez suggest that numbers of migrants and trees might not significantly affect 
incidence of conflict, but rather influence tenure security, investment in technology, and 
ideas regarding how “just” dispute resolution institutions are relying on whether 
legitimate evidence exists to address disputes. 
7.  THE TECHNOLOGY’S EFFECT ON PROPERTY RIGHTS INSTITUTIONS 
There are two overall effects of cashew agroforestry on property rights in postwar 
Mozambique.  First, the rules and customs regarding the link between agroforestry trees 
and land tenure have, in a postwar context, greatly facilitated (at no cost to the state) the 
coordination of defending and asserting rights to land, and hence land re-access and 
dispute resolution.  This has helped to organize, nonviolently (and quite apart from 




way that might not have occurred had there been no (or very few) agroforestry trees 
present in the postwar period.  Thus the technology, or an aspect of it (older existing 
trees), has and continues to play an important role in the organization of property rights in 
the period of recovery.  The existence (and comparative importance) of respected customs 
and norms regarding the connection between agroforestry trees and land, in an otherwise 
chaotic postwar tenure environment, holds considerable potential as a starting point for 
the evolution or re-formation of additional institutions regarding property rights.  Of 
significant potential here, especially over time, are forms of social evidence connectable 
to cashew trees, that is, corroborating testimony regarding lending, renting, and purchase 
of tree harvests, and times of planting and maintenance.  Also of some potential are forms 
of cultural-ecological evidence attesting to short-term occupancy, such as field 
boundaries, location of crops, and so on, which could, over time, be used to derive social 
evidence regarding these.   
The second effect of agroforestry trees as evidence on property rights has to do 
with the adoption and maintenance of cashew agroforestry as these intersect with the 
formidable tree age-gap.  The failure to adopt, or re-adopt, tree replacement strategies due 
to the high value placed on older trees as evidence will eventually result in a decrease in 
this evidence as the older trees die out, with impacts on the overall technology (loss of 
agroforestry, as opposed to adoption) and property rights.  With decreasing numbers of 
trees, their availability as forms of evidence would eventually reach a point where the set 




high value will continue to be placed on older trees unless other forms of evidence 
become available and legitimate, and institutions pertaining to these are able to evolve 
and deliver in terms of tenure security.  The derivation of other forms of evidence, 
possessed by and legitimate to smallholders, and at the same time legitimate in the formal 
land tenure system and able to compliment agroforestry trees, would likely amplify the 
number and kind of meaningful forms of evidence and relieve some of the comparative 
importance of agroforestry trees; thus allowing the adoption (or re-adoption) of practices 
necessary for agroforestry as an NRM technology.  For the control sample, even without 
customary social forms of evidence regarded as legal, there is a wider array of evidence 
available and legitimate (Table 4).  This is also the set where the greatest planting goes on 
and where the smallest percent indicated that cashew trees are an important form of 
evidence (Table 5).  Thus, while cashew trees are always expected to be an important 
form of evidence for the control (it is not significantly different from Montepuez in terms 
of importance) its comparative importance is less than for the other sets. This is due to the 
wide array of other available evidence as well as the proportionately smaller number of 
largeholders competing for land in the control area, thus enabling greater consensus on 
the legitimacy of customary evidence.  For the three samples, the increasingly wide range 
of different forms of social and cultural-ecological evidence (from Montepuez to Monapo 
to the control set) parallels the percentage believing dispute resolution and tenure security 




In addition to the tenure relationship with tree replacement, there is a potentially 
significant market disruption effect on replacement strategies.  With market and transport 
infrastructure considerably damaged during the war, the ability of commercial interests to 
purchase needed quantities of cashew over an adequately large area, and process, and 
transport shipments for export and urban consumption, has been much reduced.  As a 
result, the economic incentive to smallholders to replace older trees in order to attain 
economically viable levels of production has likewise no doubt decreased. However, the 
relative importance of an economic incentive to replacement versus a tenure benefit to 
nonreplacement is difficult to determine.  Presumably, if market and transport 
infrastructure were optimally in place in the post-war period, there would be some 
increase in replacement of trees.  However with cashew trees—the primary form of 
existing evidence to land claim in many areas—it is perhaps unlikely that replacement 
would occur to the extent that such evidence is significantly jeopardized because the 
potential loss of land (and trees) would likely be a priority economic consideration over 
any incentive to increasing cashew production on land that may be lost.  This may be 
especially important as cashew is usually the most common tree found on smallholder 
agricultural land in the country’s cashew belt, and non-native economic tree species can 
have a stronger evidence value than native, naturally occurring trees.  However over time, 
as other evidence becomes available and legitimate, the role of market incentives to tree 




The two effects of cashew agroforestry on property rights (assisting in the 
organization of land re-access, and the potential disintegration of this same evidence and 
associated institutions along with the technology itself) perhaps highlight a broader point 
about the relationship between technology adoption and property rights. In Mozambique, 
the nature of this relationship is not a static, entirely predictable one, but rather is 
necessarily influenced by a wider sociopolitical context that can influence the trajectory 
of this relationship.  As this context changes, so can the nature of the relationship. 
8.  FACTORS IMPORTANT TO THE EVOLUTION OF  
NONAGROFORESTRY EVIDENCE AND RELATED INSTITUTIONS 
LEGITIMACY 
The evolution of institutions that pertain to other forms of customary evidence 
(social, cultural-ecological) first faces a legitimacy problem with the formal tenure 
system.  Customary evidence is largely not legitimate within the formal system, and the 
statutory system is less than legitimate to many smallholders, especially for dispute 
resolution.  The incorporation of customary forms of evidence into the formal land tenure 
system (land law) is a fundamental step in making such evidence legitimate within the 
formal system, and the formal system legitimate to smallholders.  This would act to 
increase the value of such evidence among smallholders, especially in the problematic 




resolution institutions to effectively operate between customary (including migrant) and 
formal tenure systems it must be realized that it is easier to modify national land 
legislation to accommodate evidence legitimate within the customary system, than it is to 
legislate out of existence customary norms and rules regarding land tenure (Bruce et al. 
1994), in an attempt to replace the customary tenure system with the formal, so that 
everyone is “playing by the same rules.” This is not to suggest that the details of land 
tenure in all customary systems should be incorporated into formal law (an impossible 
task), but rather that the themes and tenets that embody these and make them operable, 
such as community membership, testimony, local leadership, history of occupation, 
present use, and use of in-place dispute resolution institutions for intra-community 
disputes, be recognized by statutory law. 
On the other hand, continued conflicts with largeholders in which smallholders 
lose land because the formal system does not regard customary evidence as legal would 
increase the number of smallholders having to move off land, resulting in the loss of 
important social and cultural-ecological evidence wherever they end up as migrants, 
thereby acting to stagnate the evolution of evidence and their institutions.  Adoption of 
agroforestry could then become more difficult as those dislocated from land will likely, if 
they continue to farm, be unable to plant trees on rented or borrowed land.  
Legitimacy of the formal system from the smallholder viewpoint is also an issue.  
Smallholders residing in critical resource areas, with a much greater exposure to 




unjust than do those in the control sample (bottom third of Table 3).  That the primary 
problem in land dispute resolution involving the formal system is between small and 
largeholders, and not between smallholders, is supported by the differences in the 
response of “unjust” between utilization of the formal tenure system to resolve conflicts 
between smallholders, versus between smallholders and largeholders (Table 3).  For 
Montepuez, 64 percent more of the sample believed the formal system was “unjust” when 
the dispute was between small and largeholders, as compared with use of the formal 
system for resolving disputes between smallholders.  For Monapo, this difference was 51 
percent, and for the control set, 29 percent.  For dispute resolution between smallholders 
using the formal system, approximately half of the samples from both critical resource 
areas believed this to be “very just” which is comparable to the control.  Thus, there 
exists both an opportunity and a problem regarding formal, legal land dispute resolution.  
The opportunity is that smallholders do believe the formal system has legitimacy, and this 
could be built upon.  This would increase the legitimacy of the formal system for 
smallholders and incorporate the much needed “customs and controls” of communities in 
enforcement of decisions.  The problem is that the same system (formal) is problematic 
when the dispute is between small and largeholders—acting to detract significantly from 





The evolution of institutions regarding customary forms of evidence also faces an 
availability problem.  The war has disrupted much in the way of institutions regarding 
commonly accepted social and cultural-ecological evidence for smallholders, especially 
for those who are now migrants. To a large degree, this is because the availability of the 
evidence itself was disrupted.  Time will be necessary to both increase the availability of 
evidence and re-make local institutions pertaining to this evidence.  The re-formation of 
these will be variable over time and space, and in some areas will require considerable 
time.  For areas with significant numbers of migrants (Montepuez), the question of 
availability of evidence will be more critical than for areas with fewer migrants (Monapo) or 
for established communities with very few migrants (control set).  Making forms of customary 
evidence (especially social forms) legal in the formal tenure system will have less of an 
impact, or a much delayed impact on groups that do not have this evidence significantly 
available.  In the Mozambique case, customary evidence regarded as legal will clearly be of 
greater assistance to communities such as the control areas and Monapo, as opposed to areas 
such as Montepuez, where forms of social evidence are much less available.  However, to the 
degree that customary forms of evidence are made legal in the national tenure system, one 
could imagine that the time necessary for the evolution or re-evolution of institutions 





Inclusion of customary evidence in statutory legal codes, however, will have little 
meaning to small-scale agriculturalists if the parameters of the new statutory legal 
environment are not known at the local level, and if smallholders do not have the capacity 
to engage the new legal environment.  Additional work (key informant interviews) in 
Mozambique indicated that while smallholders can perceive the statutory legal system to 
be unjust in dispute resolution with largeholders, they are unaware of the precise nature of 
the statutory legal framework regarding use and access of land resources, including 
dispute resolution. At the same time, largeholder and commercial interests are also often 
unaware of important aspects of the legal environment with regard to disputes and their 
resolution.  District level officials are frequently unaware of current and new legal tenets, 
and there is extremely limited capacity on the part of the government to diffuse this 
information outside the provincial capitals.  Even the capacity to “inform only” from the 
province to the district, and especially within the district is extremely weak and in many 
cases nonexistent.  The incapacity of the district level to deal with basic land issues is an 
important impediment to smallholders’ ability to take advantage of any legal environment 
(current or changed).  Thus, dissemination of information regarding legal tenets from the 
national capital through several layers of formal and informal land administration is a 
fundamental aspect of the evolution of effective institutions regarding legal forms of 
customary evidence.  The two critical resource areas show a certain potential in this 




of important aspects of the Land Law might be taken advantage of more quickly by this 
group, especially given the breakdown of important customary forms of evidence, 
community connection, and notions of how “just” the customary system is in dispute 
resolution between smallholders, compared with the formal system. 
9.  HAS THIS HAPPENED? 
Responding to the land tenure issues of the postwar period, the Mozambican 
Interministerial Land Commission, backed by technical support, took the lead in 
formulating a revised national land policy and land law for Mozambique.  Activities of 
the Land Commission over the previous five years included research on a number of 
important topics, local to national debates and discussions, workshops, and three national 
conferences on land issues, with discussions of land conflict resolution playing a 
prominent role in these.  On July 31, 1997, after two weeks of parliamentary debate, the 
National Assembly approved a new Land Law.  
The key changes regarding conflict resolution adopted as articles in the revised 
Law indicate 
•  Acceptance of nonwritten forms of customary evidence, such as oral testimony, to 
defend claims to land  
•  Explicit granting of land use rights to rural smallholders through occupation 
(without prejudice or inferiority compared with rights received by formal written 




•  Mandatory local community participation in the formal titling process 
•  Ability to register land in the name of the local community 
Efforts are underway in Mozambique to encourage domestic and international 
NGOs to play a role in bringing about local understanding of the revised Land Law 
through communication of relevant aspects of the revision.  This is done by a coordinated 
effort to engage in two primary activities.  The first is to take on the much-needed role of 
communicating important aspects of the revised Law to the district levels.  Second, 
NGOs, in their areas of activity, and with greater knowledge of both the formal legal 
structures and the smallholder communities they work with, are able to act as advocates 
to numerous communities, to  “walk them through” dispute resolution with largeholders, 
while smallholders continue to learn about the new legal environment.  These two aspects 
of national land policy reform in Mozambique (inclusion of customary evidence, and 
communication of the revised law to the provincial, district and local village levels) have 
the potential to encourage the evolution of land dispute resolution institutions associated 
with an amplifying menu of legitimate evidence. 
Direct information on the impact of the revised Land Law is not available due to 
the recent nature of the changes.  But what is expected is that smallholders, with an 
ability to present their own evidence that is customarily legitimate, yet legal within the 
formal system, will increasingly be able to participate in dispute resolution with 
largeholders, resulting in a greater ability to retain access to land.  Making social forms of 




evidence where it does not now exist (Montepuez) or is weak (Monapo).  This could eventually 
result in an expansion of the kinds of available evidence and associated institutions, like that 
which exists in the control community.  Increasing tenure security in this way may then take 
some of the pressure off older agroforestry trees as the sole evidence that is available and 
respected by different groups.  This in turn could result in the employment of the tree 
replacement strategies important to full adoption and maintenance of cashew agroforestry.  
Incorporation of customary land tenure evidence into formal legislation creates a 
new framework for interaction between the customary and formal tenure systems.  
Largeholders will perhaps be more willing to “cut a deal” with communities over use of 
resources if it is widely known that customary evidence in a land dispute has formal legal 
standing.  Overall, inclusion of customary evidence in formal legal codes is likely to have 
the effect of increasing community control over the resources on which they depend.  
10.  CONCLUSION 
The nature of legitimate evidence in land dispute resolution plays a fundamental 
role in the land tenure security necessary for adoption of natural resource management 
technologies.  In postwar Mozambique, forces associated with the conflict have served to 
alter the availability and legitimacy of evidence to put significant evidence value on 
cashew agroforestry trees.  The widespread presence of cashew on smallholder land 
allows these trees to provide evidence of land ownership, and constitute legitimate 




has strengthened property rights and heightened tenure security, a uniquely valuable 
service in the chaotic postwar period.  With such value placed on agroforestry trees, 
further investment in cashew would seem the logical choice.  However several forces 
serve to discourage investment in cashew planting.  
•  The high evidence value placed on agroforestry trees, together with a comparative 
lack of other evidence of equal value, means that older, nonproducing agroforestry 
trees are not removed to make space for planting cashew in tree-farm associations, 
or cashew groves.  
•  With close to half of the national population dislocated during the course of the 
war, the presence of migrants on land claimed by others is a common occurrence.  
Migrants are prevented from planting cashew due the role of tree planting in 
claiming land and because the duration of their tenure tends to be shorter. 
•  The war has created significant uncertainty over who owns what in Mozambique, 
increasing the probability of disputes and decreasing the incentives to invest 
further in cashew planting. 
•  The lack of connection between formal and customary land tenure systems has 
increased the likelihood of land disputes between smallholders and largeholders, 
particularly in critical resource areas.  The resulting uncertainty is aggravated by power 
distributions that favor commercial and largeholder interests hence lending greater 




can experience greater expectations of land loss, resulting in decreased incentives 
to invest in technologies such as cashew agroforestry. 
Such a set of opposing forces regarding the role of cashew agroforestry trees as 
evidence for land claims reveals important aspects about the adoption of NRM 
technologies.  With number of migrants highest and number of cashew trees lowest in 
Montepuez, this may explain lower measures of tenure security, and perceptions of unjust 
dispute resolution; however Monapo has a greater number of land conflicts than 
Montepuez despite a higher average number of cashew trees per person, fewer migrants, 
and greater tenure security.  This may suggest that numbers of trees and migrants do not 
affect the incidence of conflict significantly, but they do affect tenure security, investment 
in technologies, and perceptions of the “justness” of dispute resolution institutions.  Thus, 
incidence of conflicts may not necessarily significantly weaken tenure security, provided 
that forms of evidence widely perceived to be legitimate (such as cashew agroforestry 
trees) are available to resolve disputes. 
With little alternative forms of evidence available that are as widely legitimate as 
cashew trees, there exists the risk that continued nonremoval of older trees coupled with 
little planting of new trees would result in fewer trees in the future.  However, recent 
legislative revision by the Mozambican government has resulted in a formal land law that 
incorporates, to a significant degree, customary forms of evidence.  This presents the 
possibility of “valuing” alternate forms of customary evidence in land dispute resolution, 




to determine, this may have the effect of decreasing the near singular importance of cashew 
trees as evidence, and hence an important constraint to cashew tree replacement as an 






Bruce, J.W., S.E. Migot-Adholla, and J. Atherton. 1994. The findings and their 
implications: Institutional adaptation or replacement? In Searching for tenure 
security in Africa, ed. J.W. Bruce and S.E. Migot-Adholla. Dubuque, Iowa: 
Kendall/Hunt Publishing Co. 
CCL (Capricorn Consultants Limited). 1994. National cashew tree population survey, 
final report. Nairobi: Capricorn Consultants Limited. 
Cohen, S.E. 1993. The politics of planting: Israeli-Palestinian competition for control of 
land in the Jerusalem periphery. Geography Research Paper No. 236. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press. 
Finnegan, W. 1992. A complicated war. Los Angeles: University of California Press. 
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO). 1987. The cashew 
industry in Mozambique. Rome. 
Fortmann, L., and J. Bruce. 1988. Whose trees? Proprietary dimensions of forestry. 
Boulder, CO: Westview Press. 
Fortmann, L., and J. Riddell. 1985. Trees and tenure: An annotated bibliography for 
agroforesters and others. Madison and Nairobi: Land Tenure Center and ICRAF. 
Galli, R. 1992. Who will rehabilitate agriculture in the post-war period? Unpublished 
manuscript. 
Lauriciano, G. 1995. Socio-economic. Mozambique Inview. Maputo: Mediacoop.  
Middleton, J. 1988. Forward. In Land and society in contemporary Africa, ed. R.E. 
Downs, and S.P. Reyna . Hanover: University Press of New England. 
Moll, P. 1996. Call for prompt action on the Mozambique draft bill on land. World Bank 
Mozambique land brief position paper. Maputo: World Bank.  
Raintree, J.B. 1987. Land, trees, and tenure. Madison and Nairobi: Land Tenure Center 
and ICRAF. 
Tanner, C.R. 1996. Personal communication. FAO representative to the Land 
Commission, Ministry of Agriculture, Maputo.  
 
-43- 
Unruh, J.D. 1997. Post-conflict recovery of African agriculture: Critical resource tenure 
in Mozambique. Ph.D. diss., University of Arizona. 
USAID (US Agency for International Development). 1996. Mozambique: Country 
strategic plan FY 1996-FY 2001. Maputo: USAID Mozambique Mission. 
USCR (U.S. Committee for Refugees). 1993. World refugee survey. Washington, D.C. 
Willett, S. 1995. Ostriches, wise old elephants and economic reconstruction in 
Mozambique. International Peacekeeping 2:34–55.  
 
-44- 
List of CAPRi Working Papers 
 
01  Property Rights, Collective Action and Technologies for Natural Resource 
Management: A Conceptual Framework, by Anna Knox, Ruth Meinzen-Dick, and 
Peter Hazell, October 1998. 
02  Assessing the Relationships Between Property Rights and Technology Adoption in 
Smallholder Agriculture: A Review of Issues and Empirical Methods, by Frank 
Place and Brent Swallow, April 2000.  
03  Impact of Land Tenure and Socioeconomic Factors on Mountain Terrace 
Maintenance in Yemen, by A. Aw-Hassan, M. Alsanabani and A. Bamatraf, July 
2000.  
04  Land Tenurial Systems and the Adoption of a Mucuna Planted Fallow in the 
Derived Savannas of West Africa, by Victor M. Manyong and Victorin A. 
Houndékon, July 2000.  
05  Collective Action in Space:Assessing How Collective Action Varies Across an 
African Landscape, by Brent M. Swallow, Justine Wangila, Woudyalew Mulatu, 
Onyango Okello, and Nancy McCarthy, July 2000. 
06  Land Tenure and the Adoption of Agricultural Technology in Haiti, by Glenn R. 
Smucker, T. Anderson White, and Michael Bannister, October 2000. 
07  Collective Action in Ant Control, by Helle Munk Ravnborg, Ana Milena de la 
Cruz, María Del Pilar Guerrero, and Olaf Westermann, October 2000. 
08  CAPRi Technical Workshop on Watershed Management Institutions: A Summary 
Paper, by Anna Knox and Subodh Gupta, October 2000. 
09  The Role of Tenure in The Management of Trees at The Community Level: 
Theoretical and Empirical Analyses from Uganda and Malawi, by Frank Place 
and Keijiro Otsuka, November 2000. 
10  Collective Action and the Intensification of Cattle-Feeding Techniques: A Village 
Case Study In Kenya’s Coast Province, by Kimberly A. Swallow, November 
2000. 
11  Collective Action, Property Rights, and Devolution of Natural Resource 
Management: Exchange of Knowledge and Implications for Policy, A Workshop 
Summary Paper, by Anna Knox and Ruth Meinzen-Dick, January 2001. 
 